[Angelo R.] v. Saul, 796 F. App’x 49 (2d Cir. 2020)

[Angelo R]. v. Saul, 796 F. App’x 49 (2d Cir. 2020) (Decision by Rosemary S. Pooler and Gerard E. Lynch, Circuit Judges, and District Judge Jesse M. Furman, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation)

Briefs Included:

• Appellant’s Initial Brief

• Appellant’s Reply Brief 

Topics addressed:

• Past work - required findings

• Past work - composite job

• RFC - lack of support for findings

• RFC - reliance on ALJ’s lay interpretation of the record

• Transferable skills

• Harmless error
  

Rulings addressed:

• Social Security Ruling 82-41

• Social Security Ruling 82-61

• Social Security Ruling 82-62

• Social Security Ruling 83-10
  

Issues briefed:

1) The Commissioner’s finding that Appellant is capable of performing his “past relevant work as a sales representative, carting [and] moving estimator and general manager” is not supported by substantial evidence as such work was, in fact, a “composite job” also entailing medium duties. 

2) The Commissioner’s finding that Appellant can perform light work is not based on substantial evidence, as such a finding is not supported by the opinion of any physician.

Decision:
The Second Circuit first addressed Appellant’s argument that the ALJ erred in finding that he could perform light work because “rather than weigh the conflicting medical opinions in the record, the ALJ discounted the medical opinions and substituted her own judgment to interpret the raw medical data against [Appellant’s] testimony and treatment history.” 796 F. App’x at 80. The court stated that:

as we previously have held, “a circumstantial critique by non-physicians, however thorough or responsible, must be overwhelmingly compelling in order to overcome a medical opinion.” Wagner v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 862 (2d Cir. 1990).

We agree with [Appellant] that the ALJ failed to meet that high burden when she relied solely on her lay interpretation of the diagnostic tests and other non-medical evidence. “[T]he ALJ cannot arbitrarily substitute h[er] own judgment for competent medical opinion.” McBrayer v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 712 F.2d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1983). As the Commissioner conceded at oral argument, the ALJ relied heavily on [Appellant’s] past ability to exercise at the gym and play sports but failed to acknowledge that those activities ended sometime during the alleged disability period. Moreover, our review of the record demonstrates that [Appellant’s] current lifestyle is “not inconsistent” with the treating physicians’ opinions. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1998) (recognizing that a person may engage in activities like attending church and shopping while being unable to perform work for sustained periods).

The court found that the ALJ must base her RFC assessment on “some medical opinion or otherwise articulate the overwhelmingly compelling reasons for not doing so.” (citation omitted). “Absent those reasons, the ALJ had an ‘affirmative obligation’ to ‘attempt[ ] to fill any clear gaps in the administrative record’ created by inconsistencies in the medical opinions — for example, by directing the physicians to ‘supplement [their] findings with additional information.’” Id. (citing Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1999)). The court also held that the “ALJ committed error by failing to develop the record and improperly rejecting the treating physicians’ opinions.” Id.