[Tina P.] v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:23-CV-12419, 2024 WL 1660527 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 17, 2024)

[Tina P.] v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:23-CV-12419, 2024 WL 1660527 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 17, 2024) (Decision by U.S. Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris, by consent)

Briefs for purchase:

• Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum of Law

• Plaintiff’s Reply Brief 

Topics addressed:

• Specific impairment - migraine headaches

• RFC - manipulative limitations

• RFC - assistive device

• RFC - ALJ must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion

• RFC - migraine headaches

• Weight of medical opinion (old law)

• Medical expert testimony - flawed reasoning

• Court remand orders - duty to comply
  

Rulings addressed:

• Social Security Ruling 96-8p
  
• Social Security Ruling 06-3p (old law)
• Social Security Ruling 19-4p
• Acquiescence Ruling 98-4(6)
  

Issues briefed:

1)  The ALJ failed to comply with Acquiescence Ruling 98-4(6) in addressing Plaintiff’s mental impairments.

2) The ALJ erred in relying on highly flawed medical expert testimony that conflicted with well established legal standards pertaining to the evaluation of Social Security disability claims.

3) The ALJ reversibly erred by failing to comply with the remand orders requiring the ALJ to properly account for Plaintiff’s need for a cane.

4)  The ALJ erroneously evaluated Plaintiff’s migraine headache disorder and failed to account for its impact on her RFC, despite the remand orders.

5) The ALJ’s reasons for according “little weight” to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating medical provider, Kristina Y, DNP, FNP-C, are not supported by substantial evidence.

Court decision:
In a case subject to two prior remands from the same court, the court first rejected Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ failed to comply with Acquiescence Ruling 98-4(6) in not addressing a prior ALJ decision that found her adjustment disorder was a severe impairment. 2024 WL 1660527, at *9. The court noted that the ALJ explained “his rationale for rejecting the psychiatric consultant’s opinion that Tina had a ‘severe’ adjustment disorder” and “by discussing this opinion, the ALJ appears to have been aware of the 2016 decision and its findings.” Id.

The court next addressed the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff “could manipulate her hands and fingers without limitation despite her osteoarthritis.” Id. at *10. The court noted that the medical expert (“ME”):

did not clearly state whether he found Tina’s osteoarthritis to be medically determinable, whether he considered Tina’s subjective complaints when assessing her RFC, or whether he accounted for her osteoarthritis in his RFC findings. But the Court’s task is to review the ALJ’s RFC findings, not the ME’s opinions. And the ALJ’s findings concerning Tina’s osteoarthritis are just as ambiguous as the ME’s testimony.

An ALJ must articulate his or her reasoning well enough for a reviewing court to understand the basis for his or her findings. See Bailey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 98-3061, 1999 WL 96920, at *3-4 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hurst v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 753 F.2d 517, 519 (6th Cir. 1985)). Put another way, an ALJ’s decision must create a “logical bridge” between the evidence and the ALJ’s findings. Gross v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 247 F. Supp. 3d 824, 829-30 (E.D. Mich. 2017).

The ALJ here creates no such logical bridge. Unlike the ME, the ALJ explicitly recognized Tina’s osteoarthritis as a medically determinable impairment.

Id. at *11. Given these ambiguous findings, the court concluded that the ALJ “did not explain his rationale in enough detail for the Court to follow his reasoning.” Id. at *12. The court directed that on remand, “the ALJ must provide a detailed, coherent explanation for his findings regarding Tina’s ability to handle, finger, or feel objects.” Id.

Regarding headaches, the court then noted that “the most recent remand order (entered by stipulation), instruct[ed] the ALJ to ‘giv[e] further consideration to . . . whether [Tina’s] headaches affect her residual functional capacity.” Id. at *12. The court found that the ALJ did not follow these instructions. Id. at *13. In so finding, the court explained:

Although the remand order instructed the current ALJ to give “further” consideration to Tina’s headaches, for the most part, his rationale mirrors the prior decision. (Id. at PageID.1284). Like the previous ALJ, he did not mention Tina’s complaints of “debilitating” pain, nor did he mention her physician’s note that her prescribed medications were ineffective. (Id. at PageID.1230-31). He did, however, mention that Tina’s condition was “chronic” and that her symptoms were “aggravated” by “light and noise.” (Id.) He also suggested that Tina experienced worsened symptoms in 2017 because she stopped taking marijuana. (Id.)

But simply reciting this additional evidence does not explain how the ALJ concluded Tina’s headaches caused no functional limitations.  Merely acknowledging this evidence does not explain why Tina’s headaches did not cause functional limitations.  So without an explanation as to why the ALJ discounted evidence that Tina’s headaches interfered with her eyesight and were frequent and “debilitating,” the ALJ did not give “further” consideration to Tina’s migraines, as required by the remand order. See Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. at 886. And even setting the remand order aside, the ALJ’s opinion frustrates judicial review by neglecting to explain why he disregarded evidence weighing in Tina’s favor. Gross, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 829-30.

Id. at *14 (citing Gross v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 247 F. Supp. 3d 824, 829-30 (E.D. Mich. 2017)). Thus the court remanded “once again, for a more detailed explanation of how Tina’s headaches impacted her RFC.” Id.

Finally, the court held that the “ALJ explained why he discredited Tina’s alleged reliance on a cane and imposed an RFC consistent with that view.” Id. at *15. The ALJ not only “adequately explain[ed] his rationale, but he “supported his finding with substantial evidence.” Id.

The court remanded for further proceedings, directing that, on remand, SSA “shall address (1) Plaintiff’s ability to handle, finger, and feel objects and (2) the impact of Plaintiff’s migraines on her functional abilities. Id. at *15. The Administration shall explain its rationale for these findings in enough detail to permit meaningful, judicial review.” Id.